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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
CITIZENS COAL COMPANY, 
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vs. 
CAPITOL CLEANERS & DYERS, 
INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
In the Matter of the Receivership 
of Capitol Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
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SID LAMBOURNE, Treasurer of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, and 
THE CONTINENTAL NATIONAL 
BANK AND TRUST COMPANY 
OF SALT LAKE CITY, Receiver, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 
7571 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal by the United States of America from 
that part of an order of the Third Judicial District Court in 
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I~~ 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered July 13, jD~ 
1950 (R. 30-32) granting the claim of Sid Lambourne, .··rl 
County Treasurer of Salt Lake County, against the Capitol ~1 
Cleaners and Dyers, Inc., for personal property taxes for ' 
1949 and 1950 in the sum of $836.63 (with interest thereon 1~ 
at six per cent per annum from April13, 1950) priority over .~. 
that part of the claim of the United States against Capitol ·~1 
·cl·p 
Cleaners and Dyers, Inc., (hereinafter called Capitol) for .lh· 
delinquent income, withholding and unemployment taxes in :·.ire 
the sum of $2,350.94 with interest thereon as provided tnt 
therein. :Hn 
The order appealed from was entered by the court fol- ::;m 
lowing a hearing before the court on June 29, 1950 at which :;@ 
the Salt Lake County Treasurer and this appellant appeared ~m 
and offered proof of their respective claims. Also appearing 
through its attorney was The Continental National Bank ·Jj~ 
and Trust Company, the Receiver of Capitol, previously ap-
pointed by the court (R. 30). 
Proceedings in this matter were originally instituted 
}I 
when the Citizens Coal Company, as plaintiff, filed an ac-
tion on April 7, 1950 in the Third Judicial District Court .:J 
against Capitol and others not concerned with this appeal H 
(R. 1-3). The complaint asked the appointment of a re- ~ 
ceiver of the assets and property of Capitol (R. 2-3). The 
District Court issued an order to show cause why a receiver ·lie 
should not be appointed (R. 4) and a hearing was had :±1 
thereon before the court on April 14, 1950 (R. 7). There- ~~ 
ceiver was appointed by the court by order dated April 
17, 1950 (R. 8-9). 
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~;~ The premises used by Capitol were owned by one Isabel 
l~ M. LaDuke, who had secured a judgment against Capitol 
~~.~ for back rent and claimed a landlord's lien on the furniture 
~~ and fixtures owned by Capitol (R. 2). The furniture and 
~ fixtures were seized by the sheriff and advertised for sale 
')1!.:- on April11, 1950 (R. 2) but the sheriff was enjoined from 
~; proceeding with this sale by order of the court (R. 8). 
[~ LaDuke's claim has since been satisfied and that party has 
!!ir"t no interest in this appeal. 
l~~ The receiver undertook to sell the property as a going 
l~ 
concern and upon application of the receiver the court on 
June 24, 1950 approved the sale of the Capitol property 
including the cleaning and finishing equipment, office furn-
iture and the leasehold interest in the LaDuke premises to 
S. A. Blackburn and John Demarest, Jr. The terms of this 
sale provided for a total sale price of $6800, with $3000 to 
be paid immediately as a down payment and the balance to 
be paid in equal monthly installments of $71.72 or more 
per month with interest on the unpaid balance at the rate of 
five per cent per annum (R. 27). 
On April 18, 1950 the receiver, upon order of the court 
and through proper notice in the Salt Lake Tribune, a news-
paper of general circulation, directed all claimants having 
claims or demands against Capitol, to present their claims 
in writing to the receiver (R. 10, 11). Pursuant to this 
notice, claims were filed with the receiver, among others, 
by the appellant and the Treasurer of Salt Lake County for 
rll: 
: ~ taxes due from Capitol (R. 30) . 
Following receipt of the claims, the receiver on June 
3, 1950 filed its report and petition for confirmation of sale 
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and determination of priorities (R. 12-22). After due notice ~il'i 
to the claimants of the time set for hearing on the receiver's r~~ 
petition for proof and determination of priorities, the same :;i; 
was heard on June 29, 1950 by the Honorable Joseph G. 
Jeppson, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court. At the t: 1 
hearing only the receiver, the Salt Lake County Treasurer -,:;..~. 
and the appellant appeared and proof of the respective 
claims of the Treasurer and the appellant was offered and 
received ( R. 30) . 
The claim of the Treasurer of Salt Lake County was 
based upon a levy made by the Treasurer on April13, 1950 
upon the personal property, equipment and assets of Capitol 
for personal property taxes due for the years 1949 and 
1950 in the total sum of $836.63 (R. 13) (R. 30). Notice of 
this levy was posted on the premises of Capitol by the 
Sheriff of Salt Lake County on April13, 1950 and proof of 
the execution was offered and received into evidence at the 
hearing by the Treasurer as Exhibit 3 (R. 46 (3)) (R. 40, 
41). No evidence was offered by the Treasurer of Salt Lake 
County that he had taken any other steps prior to April 13, 
1950 to collect the personal property taxes due from Capitol 
for 1949 and 1950. 
The claim of the appellant, United States, against 
Capitol was based. upon various assessments made by the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue of the United States dur-
ing 1948, 1949 and 1950 for withholding, F. U. T. A. and 
F. I. C. A. taxes. The United States offered into evidence, 
and the same were received as proof of its claim, a photo-
static copy of a Notice of Tax Lien in the sum of $4,625.56 
dated October 3, 1949 and recorded October 4, 1949, in the 
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office of the Salt Lake County Recorder ( R. 46 (A) ) , and 
certified copies of certain assessment sheets ( R. 46 (B) ) 
received by the office of the Collector of Internal Revenue, 
District of Utah, showing the assessment of additional taxes 
against Capitol totaling $2350.94 by the Commissioner of 
Internal Revenue subsequent to the date the Notice of Tax 
Lien was filed in the Recorder's office. 
The recorded Notice of Tax Lien was filed by the United 
States through William J. Korth, Collector of Internal Rev-
enue for the Collection District of Utah, pursuant to the 
provisions of Sections 3670, 3671 and 3672 of the Internal 
Revenue Code of the United States (R. 46 (A)). The notice 
sets out the following taxes as having been assessed against 
Capitol by the Commissioner (R. 46 (A)) : 
Nature of Tax Date Assessment Amount of List Received Assessment 
Withholding Tax (2Q'49) 8-22-49 $ 826.14 
Withholding Tax (1Q'49) 5-23-49 690.64 
Withholding Tax (3Q'48) 2- 7-49 977.49 
Withholding Tax (4Q'48) 2-21-49 832.20 
F. I. C. A. Tax .. (2Q'49) 8-24-49 217.03 
F. I. C. A. Tax .. (1Q'49) 6- 9-49 185.34 
F. I. C. A. Tax .. (4Q'48) 3-24-49 222.17 
F. I. C. A. Tax .. (3Q'48) 2-11-49 243.60 
F. U. T. A. Tax (1948) 3-11-49 200.71 
F. U. T. A. Tax .. (1947) 3-15-48 230.24 
Total ........ $4,625.56 
The certified copies of the assessment sheets (R. 
46 (B) ) show the assessment by the Commissioner of the 
following additional taxes subsequent to the date the 
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Notice of Tax Lien was filed in the Salt Lake County Re- ~;~: 
corder's office: 
Nature of Tax Date Assessment Amount of :I List Received Assessment 
11-25-49 $ 737.32 :.tr!)" Withholding Tax ( 3Q' 49) 
Withholding Tax ( 4Q' 49) 
Withholding Tax (1Q'50) 
F. U. T. A. Tax .. (1949) 
F. I. C. A. Tax .. (4Q'49) 
F. I. C. A. Tax .. (1Q'50) 
3- 2-50 685.90 'f{ii 
r 
5-26-50 459.40 • ! I 
2- 3-50 113.12 ~ ' 
3- 6-5o 168.88 (:Miru 
5-26-50 186.32 !,)~.~j 
Total ........ $2,350.94 
Following receipt of proof of the respective tax liens of 
the United States and the Treasurer of Salt Lake County 
at the hearing on June 29, 1950, the Honorable Joseph G. 
Jeppson of the Third Judicial District Court entered an 
order fixing priorities on July 13, 1950 whereby the follow-
ing priorities were established in and to the proceeds of the 
sale of the Capitol property by the receiver (R. 30-32): 
1. United States of America for delinquent income 
withholding taxes and unemployment taxes in the sum of 
$4,625.56, with interest at six per cent (6%) per annum 
On $ 977.49 from 2-15-49 
On 832.20 from 2-28-49 
On 690.64 from 5-27-49 
On 826.14 from 8-29-49 
On 230.24 from 2-22-48 
On 200.71 from 3-18-49 
On 243.60 from 2-21-49 
On 222.17 from 3-21-49 
On 185.34 from 6-15-49 
On 217.03 from 8-30-49 (R. 31) 
Total .... $4,625.56 
n 
lJ 
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~ These are the amounts assessed and described in the 
Notice of Tax Lien (R. 46 (A)). 
2. County Treasurer of Salt Lake County for personal 
·' property taxes for 1949 and 1950 in the sum of $836.63 with 
interest at six per cent (6rc) from April 13, 1950 (R. 31). 
3. United States of America for delinquent income 
withholding taxes and unemployment taxes in the sum of 
$2,350.94 with interest at six per cent (6%) per annum 
On $ 737.32 from 11-25-49 
On 685.90 from 3- 2-50 
On 459.40 from 5-26-50 
On 113.12 from 2- 3-50 
On 168.88 from 3- 6-50 
On 186.32 from 5-26-50 (R. 31, 32) 
Total .... $2,350.94 
These are the amounts assessed subsequent to the filing 
-· of the Notice of Tax Lien and described in the appella.nt's 
~ Exhibit B (R. 46 (B)). 
4. The balance of any funds remaining in the hands 
~~ of the receiver to await the further order of the district 
ra court (R. 32). 
The appeal in this case is from that portion of the order 
granting the Salt Lake County Treasurer priority over the 
tax liens of the appellant totaling $2,350.94 and detailed in 
paragraph number 3 above (R. 33). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH 
APPELLANT INTENDS TO RELY 
POINT I. 
~~~ THE TAXES ASSESSED IN THIS CASE BY 
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REV-
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ENUE OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST 
CAPITOL BECAME LIENS AGAINST THE 
PERSONAL PROPERTY OF CAPITOL FOR 
THE AMOUNT OF EACH ASSESSMENT UP-
ON THE DATES THE ASSESSMENT LISTS 
WERE RECEIVED IN THE OFFICE OF THE 
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE AT 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH AND NOT UPON 
FILING NOTICE IN COUNTY RECORDER'S 
OFFICE. 
POINT II. 
THE REQUIREMENT THAT NOTICE OF 
SUCH LIENS BE RECORDED IN THE OF-
FICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER TO BE 
VALID APPLIES ONLY TO MORTGAGEES, 
PLEDGEES, PURCHASERS OR JUDGMENT 
CREDITORS; AND TAXES DUE A STATE, 
COUNTY OR CITY DO NOT FALL WITHIN 
ANY OF THESE CATEGORIES. 
POINT III. 
THESALTLAKECOUNTYTREASURERHAD 
NO LIEN UPON THE PROPERTY OF CAPI-
TOL FOR ITS PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES 
AT ANY TIME, BUT MERELY A RIGHT TO 
SEIZE AND SELL THE PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY FOR THE COLLECTION OF THE 
TAXES DUE HIM AND TOOK THE PROP-
ERTY SUBJECT TO THE APPELLANT'S 
TAX LIEN AT THE TIME OF THE SEIZURE 
ON APRIL 13, 1950. 
:v1 
~.U 
m 
~f 
iti 
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POINT IV. 
THE STATUTES OF A STATE GRANTING 
PRIORITY TO THE STATE IN THE COL-
LECTION OF ITS TAXES OVER ALL OTHER 
CLAIMANTS CANNOT DEFEAT THE TAX 
LIENS OF THE UNITED STATES CREATED 
BY ACT OF CONGRESS AND THE PRIN-
CIPLE OF "FIRST IN Til\IE, FIRST IN RIGHT" 
APPLIES. 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I. 
THE TAXES ASSESSED IN THIS CASE BY 
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REV-
ENUE OF THE UNITED STATES AGAINST 
CAPITOL BECAME LIENS AGAINST THE 
PERSONAL PROPERTY OF CAPITOL FOR 
THE AMOUNT OF EACH ASSESSMENT UP-
ON THE DATES THE ASSESSMENT LISTS 
WERE RECEIVED IN THE OFFICE OF THE 
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE AT 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH AND NOT UPON 
FILING NOTICE IN COUNTY RECORDER'S 
OFFICE. 
... 
It is apparent from the court's order fixing priorities 
_. (R. 30-32) that the United States was given priority on its 
::'_: tax liens over the tax claims of the Salt Lake County 
-- Treasurer for only those tax liens contained in the Notice 
of Tax Lien (R. 46 (A)) and filed in the County Recorder's 
L(: office on October 4, 1949. 
;r:: 
:L' It is the appellant's contention that in doing so the 
court erred, and that the various taxes assessed by the 
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Commissioner of Internal Revenue against Capitol and set ~:r 
out in the Statement of Facts became liens against the per- )~ 
_,, 
sonal property of the taxpayer on the respective dates on ,A 
which the assessment lists were received in the office of :ll: 
the Collector of Internal Revenue at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and further that it was not necessary that notice of such ;:te:: 
liens be filed in the office of the county recorder to make ~~~~ 
such liens valid with respect to county taxes. The require- -.~~i 
ments of Section 3672 of Title 26, United States Code Anno-
tated, that such notice must be filed in the county recorder's 
office to be valid applies only to mortgagees, pledges, pur-
chasers or judgment creditors, and this fact together with 
appellant's contention that neither state, county nor city 
taxes fall in any of these categories, is presented more fully 
in the argument on Point 2 of this brief. 
Since the court did grant the appellant priority on its 
tax liens totaling $4,625.56, which liens were contained in 
the Notice of Tax Lien filed in the county recorder's office 
on October 4, 1949, this appeal is directed only to that part 
of the court's order granting the Treasurer priority over the 
appellant's tax liens in the total sum of $2,350.94, which 
were as~essed subsequent to October 4, 1949. 
It is noted that two assessments included in the liens 
totaling $2,350.94 were made on May 26, 1950. These two ,., 
'-,'',( 
total $645.72. The remainder of $1,705.22 were all assessed :~~ 
prior to April 13, 1950, on which date the Treasurer seized 
the personal property of Capitol for sale on its tax claim 
(R. 31, 32). Assuming as contended that the liens became 
effective on the dates the assessment lists were received in 
the collector's office, it seems clear that the appellant's 
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·· · priority for its tax over the Treasurer's claim should ex-
~~: tend to and include at least the four additional assessments 
totaling $1,705.22 which were assessed after October 4, 
, 1949 but prior to April 13, 1950. That appellant's conten-
tion is correct we believe to be established by the following 
~:: statutes and authorities: 
Section 3670 of Title 26, United States Code Annotated, 
provides as follows : 
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or 
refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount 
(including any interest, penalty, additional amount, 
or addition to such tax, together with any costs that 
may accrue in addition thereof) shall be a lien in 
favor of the United States upon all the property and 
rights to property whether real or personal, belong-
ing to such person." 
The proof that demand was made upon Capitol for the 
payment of the various amounts assessed by the commission-
er in this case was established by the Notice of Tax Lien 
(R. 46 (A)), the certified copies of the assessment lists (R. 
46(B) ), and the claim of the United States for taxes (R. 
34) the latter of which sets out the dates on which interest 
on each assessment began. Section 3655 (b) of Title 26, 
United States Code Annotated, provides that interest on 
any tax assessed begins upon the date that notice and de-
mand for payment thereof is made. 
Section 3671 of Title 26, United States Code Annotated, 
provides as follows : 
"Unless another date is specifically fixed by 
law, the lien shall arise at the time the assessment 
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list was received by the Collector and shall continue 
until the liability for such amount is satisfied or 
becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time." 
Section 3312(d) (1) of Title 26, United States Code 
Annotated, provides for a six year statute of limitations on 
taxes after assessment. The liens created by Sections 3670 
and 3671, supra, and under consideration in this case have 
therefore not become unenforceable by lapse of time. 
Article VI of the Constitution of the United States pro-
vides that the Constitution and laws made in pursuance 
thereof shall be the supreme law of the land. 
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides that 
Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes and 
to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to 
carry this and other powers into execution. 
Article VI, paragraph 2 of the Constitution provides 
that: 
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; 
* * * shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; 
and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, 
anything in the Constitution or Laws of any State 
to the contrary notwithstanding." 
The wording of Sections 3670 and 3671 makes it clear 
that the lien attaches as of the date the assessment list is 
received in the Collector's office. It has also been uniformly 
so held by the courts, subject to the exception of Section 
3672. 
In Citizens State Bank of Barstow, Texas v. Vidal, 114 
F. 2d 380, the Court of Appeals, lOth Circuit, in a case in 
which the issue was priority of liens, stated: 
.. I ~I I 
. ~.l 
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"The tax lien upon all the 'property and rights 
to property' * * * became effective as of the 
date upon which the assessment list, signed by the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, covering the 
assessments was received in the office of the Col-
lector of the District of New Mexico and became a 
valid lien against the claims of Montgomery (the 
taxpayer) for work, labor and materials. * * *" 
In Filipowicz v. Rothensies, 43 F. S. 619, the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated as 
follows, after quoting Sections 3670 and 3671 of Title 26, 
United States Code Annotated: 
"The above stated provisions with respect to 
the effective date of liens for Federal taxes have 
been considered in several recent cases, and it is 
generally agreed that the language of Section 3671 
is to be interpreted literally-that is, the lien arises 
at the time the assessment list is received by the 
collector." (Cases cited.) 
In United States v. Record Publishing Company, 60 
F. S. 194, decided April 20, 1945 by the District Court, 
Northern District of California, Northern Division, the 
issue involved priority of tax liens and after quoting Sec-
~:. tions 3670, 3671 and 3672 of the Internal Revenue Code, the 
;:. court said : 
"Hence, as against other liens not given a pre-
ference by statute, the lien of the United States on 
the funds collected by defendants Richards and 
Deuel arose 'at the time the assessment list was re-
ceived by the Collector'." 
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POINT II. 
THE REQUIREMENT THAT NOTICE OF 
SUCH LIENS BE RECORDED IN THE OF-
FICE OF THE COUNTY RECORDER TO BE 
VALID APPLIES ONLY TO MORTGAGEES, 
PLEDGEES, PURCHASERS OR JUDGMENT 
CREDITORS; AND TAXES DUE A STATE, 
COUNTY OR CITY DO NOT FALL WITHIN 
ANY OF THESE CATEGORIES. 
With reference to the lien created by Section 3670 of 
the Internal Revenue Code and which by Section 3671 be-
comes a lien as of the date the assessment list is received by 
the Collector, Section 3672, I. R. C. reads as follows: 
"(a) Such lien shall not be valid as against 
any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser or judgment 
creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the 
collector-
" (1) In accordance with the law of the State 
or Territory in which the property subject to the 
lien is situated, whenever the State or Territory has 
by law provided for the filing of such notice. * * *" 
Section 52-6-1, U. C. A. 1943, provides that notices of 
liens for federal taxes and certificates discharging such 
liens shall be filed in the office of the county recorder of 
the county within which any property subject to the lien 
is situated. 
It is apparent from a reading of the statutes above 
quoted with respect to filing notice of the federal tax lien 
that such notice need be filed to make the lien valid only in 
the case of mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers and judgment 
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creditors. With respect to all others it follows that the fed-
eral tax lien is valid as of the date the assessment list is 
received in the collector's office. The contentions of the 
appellant that the requirement of filing of notice applies 
only to the four classes described in Section 3672 and that 
state, county and city taxes do not fall in any of the four 
categories are supported by the authorities. 
In United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 
Executor, et al., 340 U. S. 47, decided November 13, 1950, 
the question presented was whether a tax lien of the United 
States is prior in right to an attachment lien where the 
federal tax lien was recorded subsequent to the date of the 
attachment lien but prior to the date the attaching creditor 
obtained judgment. The California statute defined the at-
tachment lien, and the Supreme Court held the federal tax 
lien was superior to the inchoate attachment lien. 
In a concurring opinion Mr. Justice Jackson stated: 
"I am persuaded that we are required to hold 
the tax lien of the government superior to the Cali-
fornia attachment. While we should accept the law 
of California as its court has declared it, the federal 
question remains whether it is in conflict with 26 
U. S. C. Sections 3670-72. * * * The history of 
this tax lien statute indicates that only a judgment 
creditor in the conventional sense is protected." 
Mr. Justice Jackson then points out that prior to the 
-- amendment (1913) which provided that the lien should not 
be valid as against any mortgagee, purchaser or judgment 
creditor until notice of such lien was filed by the collector, 
the Supreme Court in U. S. v. Snyder, 149 U. S. 210, had 
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ruled that the lien statute created a valid binding lien even 
against a bona fide purchaser for value without knowledge 
or notice of the existence of such a lien. He further points 
out that a later amendment ( 1939) added pledgees to the 
1913 amendment. He concludes by saying: 
"My conclusion from this history is that the 
statute excludes from the provisions of this secret 
lien those types of interests which it specifically in-
cluded and no others." 
In MacKenzie v. United States, 109 F. 2d 540, the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a case in which the 
appellant therein had levied attachment prior to obtaining 
judgment and prior to the recording of the federal tax lien, 
stated: 
"In 1913 A, 37 Stat. 1016, Congress added the 
provision that the tax lien shall not be valid against 
any mortgagee, purchaser or judgment creditor until 
recordation of the notice. Congress at this time un-
doubtedly recognized that under the statute as it 
existed prior to 1913 no third person was protected 
under any circumstances from an unrecorded Fed-
eral tax lien. By the 1913 amendment it intended to 
extend protection, not to all third parties, but to the 
three classes of third parties designated therein, 
namely, mortgagees, purchasers and judgment cred-
itors. We conclude that in order to be protected, the 
claimant must show that he is within one of those 
three classes." 
Thus, in the case under consideration on this appeal, 
unless the county treasurer falls into one of the four cate-
gories enumerated in Section 3672 of the Internal Revenue 
:~. [I 
::ill. 
.:pt 
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Code, notice of the Federal tax liens need not be recorded 
to make them valid as against the county tax claims. It will 
be pointed out in the argument under point 3 of this brief 
that the county treasurer had no rights in the personal 
property of Capitol until actual seizure thereof on April 
13, 1950 and therefore was seized subject to all prior exist-
ing valid federal tax liens. 
It appears clear from a reading of the above quoted 
federal lien statutes and cases cited that taxes due a state, 
city or county do not fall within the classes enumerated in 
the statute, namely, mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers or 
judgment creditors and we believe the cases so hold. 
In United States v. San Juan County, 280 F. 120, an 
early and frequently cited United States District Court case, 
the court there said that, 
"neither the state nor county are judgment creditors, 
mortgagees, or purchasers and hence are not af-
fected by the provisions of Section 3672, Title 26." 
In State v. Wynne, 113 S. W. (2d) 325, reversed on 
other grounds in 133 S. W. (2d) 951, the State of Texas 
contended that the government's lien would not be valid 
until filing of notice of the federal tax lien and that the 
state's lien attached prior to compliance with this require-
ment and hence took precedence over the lien for federal 
taxes. The State Court of Civil Appeals said: 
"Furthermore, the state was not a 'mortgagee, 
purchaser or judgment creditor' and hence in no 
position to invoke these statutory provisions." (Sec-
tion 3672 of Title 26.) 
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In United States v. City of Greenville, 118 F. 2d 963, 
the Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, ruled clearly that 
with respect to the priority of federal, state, county and city 
taxes, the federal taxes became valid liens as soon as the 
assessment lists were filed in the Collector's office. That 
case involved two suits to foreclose liens of the United 
States for income taxes on real estate owned by two tax-
payers. The assessment lists assessing the income taxes 
due for prior years were received in the Collector's office 
for the district involved on May 20, 1930. The state, county 
and city of Greenville, in South Carolina, had tax claims 
against the same property which taxes were assessed sub-
sequent to the year 1930. This was also true with respect 
to special assessments, except for one item of $835.75 
assessed by the city of Greenville in 1929. The trial court 
held that the taxes and special assessments of the state, 
county and city were entitled to priority over the precedent 
liens of the United States on the grounds that the former 
were specific liens while the latter were general. 
The Court of Appeals, in reversing the judgment and 
granting priority to the United States over the state, coun-
ty and city, except with respect to the item of $835.75 
assessed by the city of Greenville in 1929, stated: 
"It is true, of course, that the state, county and 
city taxes were assessed against the specific prop-
erty and became liens upon it. And the same is true 
of the paving assessments made by the city. But 
these liens were acquired subsequent to the acquisi-
tion of the liens of the United States for income taxes 
which became liens upon the property, no less valid 
than if they had been assessed against the property 
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itself, as soon as the assessments were filed in the 
Office of the Collector of Internal Revenue." 
The reasoning of this case is cited with approval by the 
Sixth Circuit in Paul v. United States, 127 F. 2d 64, and 
shows that state, county and city taxes do not fall within 
the provisions of Section 367:2. 
POINT III. 
THESALTLAKECOUNTYTREASURERHAD 
NO LIEN UPON THE PROPERTY OF CAPI-
TOL FOR ITS PERSONAL PROPERTY TAXES 
AT ANY TIME, BUT l\'IERELY A RIGHT TO 
SEIZE AND SELL THE PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY FOR THE COLLECTION OF THE 
TAXES DUE HIM AND TOOK THE PROP-
ERTY SUBJECT TO THE APPELLANT'S 
TAX LIEN AT THE TIME OF THE SEIZURE 
ON APRIL 13, 1950. 
The statutes of the State of Utah do not provide that a 
tax on personal property of the kind herein involved creates 
a lien on that personal property. 
Section 80-10-1 of the Utah Code Annotated 1943 pro-
vides that: 
~: "Every tax has the effect of a judgment against 
ti: the person, and every lien created by this title has 
~ · the force and effect of an execution duly levied 
:t. against all personal property of the delinquent. The 
t- judgment is not satisfied nor the lien removed until 
.:;~ the taxes are paid or the property sold for the pay-
~~ ment thereof (C. L. 17, Sec. 5995)." 
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Section 80-10-2 provides that: 
"Every tax upon personal property is a lien 
upon the real property of the owner thereof, from 
and after 12 o'clock m. of the 1st day in January of 
each year." 
Taylor Motor Car Company v. Salt Lake County, 74 
Utah 594, 281 Pac. 49, was an action brought by the Taylor 
Motor Car Company against Salt Lake County under the 
Declaratory Judgment Act. The facts alleged and admitted 
were that a general tax in 1927 was assessed and levied on 
an automobile then owned and possessed by one Brockel-
bank, who, without paying the tax, on April 1, 1928, for 
value sold the car to the plaintiff. Thereafter the tax col-
lector of the county demanded payment of the tax from the 
plaintiff and, upon its refusal to pay it, threatened to seize 
and sell the car in payment of the tax. 
The court below held that the tax was not a lien on the 
car and that the plaintiff was not liable for the tax, and 
enjoined the county and its officers from seizing or selling 
the car. The county appealed and the Supreme Court of 
Utah, in affirming the judgment, said : 
"The question involved is as to whether a gen-
eral tax on personal property is a lien on the prop-
erty against which it is assessed and levied." 
In its opinion the court said: 
"It is a general rule, and it is not seriously dis-
puted, but a general tax assessed and levied on per-
sonal property is not a lien on the property so 
assessed and levied, unless it is so provided by sta-
tute" (Cases cited) . 
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The appellant in that case asserted that by our Utah 
statutes a general tax on personal property is made a lien 
on the property taxed. The court, in holding otherwise, 
said: 
"Apparently the only section pertinent to the 
inquiry is section 5995, just quoted (Now 80-10-1). 
The only lien created by the tax title is a lien on real 
estate. It declares a tax on a personal property of 
the owner to be lien on real estate owned by him, 
* * *. The tax title does not in express terms de-
clare a tax on personal property to be a lien on the 
personal property itself assessed and taxed. It is 
claimed that by necessary implication section 5995 
of the statute creates such a lien. Under similar pro-
visions of taxing statutes of Idaho and Montana, the 
courts of those states held to the contrary (Cases 
cited). 
"We think the interpretation given such a sta-
tute is the correct interpretation. As is seen, the 
statute does not declare that every tax, but every 
lien created 'by this title' has the force and effect 
of an execution duly levied against the personal prop-
erty of the delinquent. And, as is seen, the liens 
created by the title are liens only on real estate and 
not on personal property." 
In Crystal Car Line v. State Tax Commission, 174 P. 
2d 984, the Supreme Court of Utah, in discussing the effect 
_. of Section 80-10-1, U. C. A. 1943, stated, after quoting this 
section in part : 
"Applying this provision, the tax levied against 
the car company then has the effect of a judgment. 
One of the effects of a judgment is that it is a lien 
on the real estate of the judgment debtor in the 
county where docketed. But if there is no real estate, 
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there is no lien for these personal property taxes to 
attach and consequently since there is no lien for i ~ 
these taxes, they have not the force and effect of an 
execution duly levied against the personal property ~~· 
of the delinquent." 
The Utah statutes provide for the collection of taxes 
on personal property and the manner in which such is to be 
done. Section 80-10-4 states : 
"At the time of making the assessment the 
assessor shall collect the taxes on all personal prop-
erty when, in his opinion, such taxes are not a lien 
on real property sufficient to secure the payment of 
the taxes, unless such taxes are at the request of the 
owner attached to and made a lien on real property 
within the same taxing unit sufficient to secure the 
payment of the taxes, or the taxpayer furnishes a 
good and sufficient bond, payable to the county in 
an amount twenty per cent in excess of the tax, 
conditioned for the payment of the tax prior to the 
30th day of November." 
Section 80-10-5 is as follows : 
"Unless taxes on personal property are paid or 
secured as provided for in the next preceding sec-
tion, at the time of making the assessment or at any 
time before the first l\londay of June following the 
assessment the assessor shall collect the taxes, by 
seizure and sale of any personal property owned by 
the person against whom the tax is assessed, in the 
same manner as provided for seizure and sale of per-
sonal property by the county treasurer." 
Section 80-10-47 reads: 
"The treasurer may collect the taxes delinquent 
on personal property, except when sufficient real 
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estate is liable therefor, by seizure and sale of any 
personal property owned by the delinquent." 
The manner of conductng the sale and publishing notice 
thereof is also provided by statute. 
From the foregoing statutes and cases it can be seen 
that in the case now before the court the Salt Lake County 
Treasurer had no lien on the property for the 1949 and 
1950 personal property taxes of Capitol. 1 There being no 
evidence that the assessor either collected the taxes at the 
time of the assessment or required Capitol to furnish a bond 
as provided in the statute, it follows that the County 
Treasurer to protect his tax must seize and sell the property 
of the delinquent to collect it. 
Having failed to do so prior to April 13, 1950, the 
Treasurer on that date seized the property subject to all 
the federal taxes assessed against Capitol prior thereto. 
"It is the very nature and essence of a lien that 
no matter into whose hands the property goes it 
passes cum onere." 
Michigan v. United States, 317 U. S. 338. 
POINT IV. 
THE STATUTES OF A STATE GRANTING 
PRIORITY TO THE STATE IN THE COL-
LECTION OF ITS TAXES OVER ALL OTHER 
CLAIMANTS CANNOT DEFEAT THE TAX 
1~ven if the County Treasurer had had a lien on the property, by 
VIrtue of Sec. 80-10-1 of the Utah Code, it was inchoate until made 
specific and perfected by seizure of the property. Illinois v. Campbell, 
829 U. S. 362, 872-376. And it is now settled that an inchoate lien is 
subordinate in priority to the tax liens of the United States. United 
States v. Security Tr. & Sav. Bk., 840 U. S. 47. 
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LIENS OF THE UNITED STATES CREATED 
BY ACT OF CONGRESS AND THE PRIN-
CIPLE OF "FIRST IN TIME, FIRST IN RIGHT" 
APPLIES. 
Perhaps enough has been said concerning the issue in 
this case, but nevertheless, it appears desirable to make 
some comment concerning the effect on federal tax liens 
of state statutes which normally grant priority to the state 
in the collection of its taxes over all other. claimants. 
In Michigan v. United States, 317 U. S. 338, decided 
January 4, 1943 by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
the petitioners therein were the City of Detroit, the county 
of Wayne, and the State of Michigan. They asserted liens 
for city, county and state taxes accruing subsequent to a 
federal estate tax lien, and contended that the state liens 
were given superiority over the unrecorded federal tax lien 
by virtue of state statutes. The Supreme Court in holding 
otherwise stated that it considered petitioners' argument 
"ignores the effect of a lien for federal taxes under the 
supremacy clause of the constitution." Continuing, the 
court said: 
"It is not debatable that a tax lien imposed by a 
law of Congress * * *, cannot, without the 
consent of Congress, be displaced by later liens im-
posed by authority of any state law or judicial de-
cision." 
In United States v. Greenville, quoted at length, supra, 
the court added : 
,.,. 
... ; 
it 
:\ 
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"It would seem, however, that the lien was in-
tended to attach to the property of the taxpayer 
subject to existing encumbrances; and this is born 
out by the provision that it shall not be valid as 
against mortgagees, purchasers or judgment credi-
tors until notice thereof is duly filed as provided by 
the act. This interpretation places liens of the fed-
eral government and liens of the states on an equal 
basis for the application of the principle first in 
time, first in right (Rankin v. Scott, 12 Wheat 177) 
which is the principle ordinarily applied with respect 
to priority of liens." 
The appellant therefore respectfully submits that with 
respect to its priority over taxes due Salt Lake County, its 
liens became valid and effective on the various dates the 
assessment lists were received in the Collector's office, that 
such liens did not have to be recorded to be valid against the 
county tax claims; that the county treasurer had no rights 
that could be accorded priority until the time of the seizure 
of the property on April 13, 1950, and that this appellant 
should be granted priority in payment of its tax liens over 
the claim of Salt Lake County for all taxes assessed and 
received in the Collector's office prior to April 13, 1950, 
irrespective of whether notice of such liens was filed in the 
county recorder's office. 
It is further respectfully submitted that the order 
- fixing priorities entered by the District Court should be 
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corrected and the appellant accorded priority in payment 
of its tax lien in the total sum of $6,330.78 instead of $4,-
625.56. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SCOTT M. MATHESON, 
United States Attorney, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
BRYANT H. CROFT, 
Assistant United States Attorney, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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